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https://codeberg.org/mister_monster

09F911029D74E35BD84156C5635688C0

  • 9 Posts
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Joined 2 years ago
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Cake day: June 14th, 2023

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  • The primary reason to not use PoS is simply having an ongoing cost and expense external to the network.

    So when we quantify mining revenue and staking revenue, what we usually do is quantify risk. A miner must make an investment and has an average expected return, their exposure is partly to volatility of bitcoin for example and to energy prices and what not. A staker of ethereum for example doesnt really have this, their risk is only in making mistakes, server downtime, opportunity cost. The slashing rates and things are designed with incentive in mind primarily, and expected risk losses are downstream of those decisions. But we always quantify it in terms of risk, but theres another big side of this: ongoing expense.

    There is a minimal ongoing cost to staking. Make your initial investment, get high uptime on your node, youre good. A miner has an ongoing cost, in energy, in big facilities, in hardware depracation. Additionally, a miner has an ongoing cost external tp the network. This os a very big thing. they have to buy energy, hardware. A staker doesn’t have anything like that, their activity is entirely internal to the network.

    There are major game theoretical implications to these big differences. There are pros and cons, but all in all I and most people, and particularly in the Monero world, think PoW handily wins out.









  • Well, the concept of a ban list seems ripe for abuse. We have to trust someone to tell us canonically who the bad nodes are, people can slap a fed honeypot node label on you for not going along with something.

    What we need to do is design the system such that a bad node can do nothing but participate in the network. Just like the mining incentive structure with nakamoto consensus. Dandelion++ is supposed to do that, at least for everyone broadcasting their transactions only to initial nodes they know and trust. I don’t know how to do that, but a blacklist is a dangerous stopgap.





  • Dude quit trying to ascribe reasons. Nobody knows, we have pet theories, maybe they fit the empirically observed phenphenomena, maybe not. You see one too many news sites saying “bitcoin breaks 95k as fed reduces interest rates” and think there’s some formula or magic ball or insiders or something, every article like that is lies and paid propaganda. we don’t know.

    We can deduce though, since XMR appears to fluctuate not entirely in lock step with bitcoin, that it’s short term demand changes are not for the same reasons, or by the same people, as bitcoin. My pet theory is that after spikes in btc and ETH and what not, people sell, and a lot of that gets moved through XMR to break the links. That’s been my hypothesis for a few years now for why xmr appears to spike in between bitcoin or ETH jumps, and so my mental model predicts that a spike in btc will often be followed by a spike in xmr, so it’s predictive and therefore should be empirically testable.






  • It’s suicides. Almost 60% of gun deaths are suicides.

    Gun deaths reached their last peak in the US around 1975. At that time the rate between homicide and suicide was about 50/50. So it’s not like suicides were very low with guns, guns are probably the most quick and effective way to kill yourself and if you want to be dead, using a gun is the gold standard. Still, from 50% to 60% is a very significant change. It’s also important to note, there is more variability in gun homicide than there is in suicide (though there is still a little bit of a positive correlation), so in times of low violent crime the disparity grows.