newacctidk [none/use name]

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Joined 7 months ago
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Cake day: July 14th, 2024

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  • I am curious about how internally Juche is compared to Marxism-Leninism? Is Hwang Jang-yop talked about when discussing the development of Juche or was his particular role in it overblown. Connected to this, what are the average supporters of the other political parties like? Is their support mostly from certain strongholds (Like the Revolutionary Committee of the Chinese Kuomintang in China being mostly family of original Left KMT members) or do random people just develop sympathies to other political lines even within Worker’s Party supporting families?

    Thank you for your time, all solidarity and love to the Korean people.


  • Later years Mao making compromises is not a stretegy to map onto whatever the heck america’s left is. Here is a excerpt from the People’s History of Ideas podcast in which Mao has essentially laid out the opposite of what you are saying, and in this case applied to the actual material conditions and to revolution, not maintaining power.

    So Mao is saying that correct revolutionary strategy can’t only be deduced from using the theory that they had, he is saying that somehow there had to be some kind of influence, or oversight, or something coming from the masses, or else you’re going to have an incorrect revolutionary strategy. No one else is saying this at this meeting, so it really stands out.

    So what is going on here? Now, there used to be historians who would look at statements like this and said that Mao wasn’t really a Marxist, he was just some peasant nationalist or populist or something. But we know too much about Mao these days to say Mao wasn’t a Marxist. He clearly was very committed to Marxist ideology. No one who seriously studies Chinese history would say that Mao wasn’t a serious Marxist today, however unorthodox he might seem, depending on what you think constitutes Marxist orthodoxy, which would be a whole other digression which we’ll avoid right now.

    Well, and I’ll make this quick, because we’ve covered this history in some detail in past episodes of this podcast, what had been the experience so far of the Chinese Revolution with the dominant epistemology of just deducing what needed to be done from a preexisting body of theory? A bunch of very smart people decided that, based on an analysis of Chinese society, that a policy of uniting with the progressive section of the Chinese national bourgeoisie was necessary to move China toward socialism, because it had to go through a stage of democratic revolution and there was a necessary role to be played by the national bourgeoisie in that process. OK, fair enough. Now, as events evolved, questions were posed about what sort of sacrifices of the interests of the peasants and workers would need to be made to successfully pursue this strategy of uniting with the national bourgeoisie, embodied in the Guomindang Left which was led by Wang Jingwei. Mikhail Borodin and Chen Duxiu made difficult decisions, decisions that we know that they agonized over, that in the long term interests of the peasants and workers themselves, the Communist Party would have to acquiesce in the suppression of the peasant associations in Hunan by the militarists associated with the Guomindang Left. We’re talking serious massacres here. Borodin and Chen didn’t like to do this, but, they felt that this was the sort of hard headed decision making that had to be done in the overall interests of oppressed people. Eventually, they thought, their way of approaching the United Front would lead to liberation, and presumably when you added up the body count of dead peasants and workers at the end of the day, less would die through the strategy they were advocating than if they had taken a different course which ultimately wouldn’t lead to liberation.

    Right, that’s the thinking there. That’s the thinking that Mao was characterizing as counter-revolutionary. And of course, Qu Qiubai and Besso Lominadze, the Comintern representative, also characterized this policy as seriously mistaken at the August 7 Emergency Conference. But, Qu and Lominadze argued that it was a mistaken application of Marxism, while Mao argues that it was due to “the influence of the masses over the Party leadership was far too small in the past.” Now, what did this mean? What was Mao saying here? Mao was a Marxist, so he thought that applying Marxist theory was necessary to come up with correct revolutionary strategy.But he also seems to be saying that, look, if the strategy that you come up with leads you down a path where you are acquiescing in the massacre of peasants, the suppression of workers’ unions, in the name of your revolutionary strategy, then you’ve gone off the rails somewhere. So, there needs to be some check on the Party and whether it is really revolutionary or not, and this comes, in some form or another, in the form of the masses having some important influence on the party. On some fundamental level, there is an element in the epistemology of revolutionary strategy and policy that relies on being in touch with and influenced by the masses.

    And this is going to be a recurring theme in Mao, and is made more explicit in many of his widely read works, and I think is an important part of his appeal worldwide later on as the years go by. This sense of the inadequacy of revolutionary theory which is not checked or supervised by the masses, and which we see become disconnected from and, contrary to the initial intents of revolutionary organizations around the world, turned against the masses of people in so many instances over the course of the 20th century. Certainly, we see this thinking informing the Cultural Revolution. And really, I don’t think Mao always lives up to this ideal throughout his entire life, but you can judge that for yourself as we go on studying the history of global Maoism.

    The statement in question is

    “Before I arrived in Changsha, I had no reason to oppose the Party’s decision, which sided entirely with the landlords. Even after arriving in Changsha, I was still unable to answer this question. It was not until I had stayed in Hunan for more than 30 days that I completely changed my attitude. I made a report in Hunan expressing my opinion, and simultaneously also sent a report to the Center.” (Again, I want to refer listeners to episode 41 for our discussion of these reports that Mao made from Hunan and his experience there.) “This report had its impact in Hunan, but it had no influence whatever on the Center. The broad masses inside and outside the Party want revolution, yet the Party’s guidance is not revolutionary; there really is a hint of something counterrevolutionary about it. I have established these views under the guidance of the peasants. Formerly, I thought the opinion of the leading comrades was right, so I didn’t really insist on my own views. Thus my opinions, which they said were unreasonable, did not prevail… In sum, the influence of the masses over the Party leadership was far too small in the past.”

    https://peopleshistoryofideas.com/episode-56-the-decisive-turn-to-overthrowing-the-guomindang-the-7-august-1927-emergency-conference/










  • Honestly Romney was to Biden’s left on segregation. He was certainly an opportunist and did shit like not marching in Detroit with MLK because “it was a Sunday” but then showing up the next saturday to march and subsequently claiming he was there the entire time. But Romney had this weird third positionist stance which served him really well. The GOP disliked him, seeing him as another Eisenhower, someone very much opposed to the Birchers and Goldwater, though the whole “walked out of the convention” this is a total lie one mostly spun by Mitt.

    https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/johnrbohrer/making-mitt-the-myth-of-george-romney

    After Cleveland, Romney distanced himself from the stop-Goldwater faction as they endorsed Scranton and promoted party-platform amendments to support civil rights and denounce extremism. Romney instead declared his neutrality and developed his own pro-civil rights and anti-extremism platform amendments. He portrayed himself as a broker, not a member of a moderate faction. “In some things I’m more conservative than Barry Goldwater,” Romney said. (“He did not elaborate,” the Detroit News retorted.) Gerald Ford, then a Michigan congressman rising in prominence, set up a meeting for Romney with Republican leaders in Washington to lobby for his planks, and Romney incorporated their input. He accommodated conservatives by not specifically naming the John Birch Society in the anti-extremism plank because “I am unwilling to condemn anyone on a group basis” — news to his Bircher foe Richard Durant. He also backed off an effort to label the civil rights bill “constitutional.” He was being a team player, open to suggestion, unlike the stop-Goldwater clique.

    Of course, Romney might simply have been positioning himself as the neutral alternative if the convention deadlocked between Goldwater and Scranton and moved to draft someone else. Romney announced he was running for reelection as Michigan’s governor in May, yet waited until the very last day of the deadline to file his petition signatures — four days after the July national convention.

    This quote sums him up so well

    “Romney perplexes his less-principled observers, for no one is ever exactly sure what his principles will tell him to do.”

    Honestly similar to Biden